America in Vietnam: The War That Couldn't Be Won

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Product Details
Price
$129.60
Publisher
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Publish Date
Pages
232
Dimensions
6.0 X 9.1 X 0.9 inches | 1.01 pounds
Language
English
Type
Hardcover
EAN/UPC
9780742566972

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About the Author
Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler (Ret) was George C. Marshall Professor of Grand Strategy at National Defense University.
Reviews
As Herb Schandler convincingly argues, there are situations in the world that the United States cannot resolve militarily. The Vietnam War was the South's to lose and never America's to win. Read this compelling book and weep for those who tried.--Volney Warner, General, US Army (Retired)
Schandler . . . views the Vietnam War through the eyes of the North Vietnamese, a perspective sadly lacking during that disastrous conflict. . . . While helping Americans understand what went wrong in Vietnam, Schandler's message is even more important in helping recalibrate the chance for our success in the current guerrilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.-- "Historywire"
What makes this work unique is that the author offers insight into North Vietnamese perceptions of war by including discussions and interviews with former officials. . . . Recommended.-- "Choice Reviews"
A scholarly and well-written book that provides a unique perspective not only on America in Vietnam, but also on what the other side was thinking. . . . Highly recommended.-- "Parameters"
Relying extensively on sources in the former North Vietnam, Schandler illustrates how North Vietnamese perceptions of the struggle were never understood by American policymakers.-- "Booklist"
A competent summary of principal arguments holding that the United States embarked on a futile and misguided quest in Vietnam. . . . Both highly readable and thoughtfully argued. As a concise exposition on the inexorable logic of failure in Vietnam, it fulfills the author's intent and provides a good foundation for a nonspecialist seeking a basic explanation of America's withdrawal from Vietnam.-- "Military Review"
[Schandler] stands out, however, as the most significant orthodox scholar coming from a military background. . . . Schandler's account is especially useful in understanding civilian-military relations and North Vietnam's response to American warfare. The conclusions are well-stated and persuasive.
-- "Pacific Affairs"