Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
Description
Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe. Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West-including combat records of early engagements-David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns--and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany. Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated. At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness-and willingness-to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.Product Details
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About the Author
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969 and served in various assignments in the United States and Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army's Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army's newly formed Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual Art of War symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of several former German participants in the operations and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings.
Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army's Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel. In 1993 he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History's prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history. Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II. He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
Reviews
"David Glantz is indisputably the West's foremost expert on the subject."--The Atlantic
"An important addition to the author's other works on the Eastern Front in the Second World War."--H-Net Reviews
"This book represents the most thorough and intensive examination of the state of the Red Army in 1941 yet to appear. It investigates every aspect of the Soviet military establishment, command, deployment, mobilization, reserves, the Soviet soldier himself, and above all, combat readiness, using Soviet and German archives. Glantz's evidence is unchallengeable, his sources unimpeachable, his conclusion incontestable."--John Erickson, author of The Road to Stalingrad
"Effectively refutes the charge--recently rehabilitated by Viktor Suvorov in Icebreaker--that Stalin was secretly planning an offensive war against Hitler during 1941. With his previous book When Titans Clashed and this latest contribution, David Glantz has established firmly his reputation as the preeminent historian of the Soviet Army."--Mark von Hagen, author of Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship
"An outstanding contribution and a must for any student of the history of the Red Army and the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War."--Malcolm Mackintosh, author of Juggernaut: A History of Soviet Armed Forces